A review on the decoy-state method for practical quantum key
  distribution by Wang, Xiang-Bin
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
05
09
08
4v
3 
 1
9 
Se
p 
20
05
A review on the decoy-state method for practical quantum key
distribution
Xiang-Bin Wang
IMAI Quantum Computation and Information Project,
ERATO, JST, Daini Hongo White Bldg. 201,
5-28-3, Hongo, Bunkyo, Tokyo 133-0033, Japan
Abstract
We present a review on the historic development of the decoy state method, including the
background, principles, methods, results and development. We also clarify some delicate concepts.
Given an imperfect source and a very lossy channel, the photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack can
make the quantum key distribution (QKD) in practice totally insecure. Given the result of ILM-
GLLP, one knows how to distill the secure final key if he knows the fraction of tagged bits. The
purpose of decoy state method is to do a tight verification of the the fraction of tagged bits. The
main idea of decoy-state method is changing the intensities of source light and one can verify the
fraction of tagged bits of certain intensity by watching the the counting rates of pulses of different
intensities. Since the counting rates are small quantities, the effect of statistical fluctuation is very
important. It has been shown that 3-state decoy-state method in practice can work even with the
fluctuations and other errors.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROOUND
Although many standard quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols such as BB84[1]
have been proven to be unconditionally secure[2, 3, 4], this does not guarantee the security
of QKD in practice, due to various types of imperfections in a practical set-up. In practical
QKD, the source is often imperfect. Say, it may produce multi-photon pulses with a small
probability. Normally weak coherent state is used in practical QKD. The probability of
multi-photon pulses is around 10% among all non-vacuum pulses. On the other hand, the
channel can be very lossy. For example, if we want to do QKD over a distance longer than
100kms, the overall transmittance can be in the magnitude order of 10−3 or even 10−4. This
opens a door for the Eavesdropper (Eve) by the so called photon-number-splitting (PNS)
attack[5].
It was then shown by Inamori, Lu¨tkenhaus and Mayers (ILM)[7] and by Gottesman et
al (GLLP)[8] on how to distill the secure final key even with an imperfect source, provided
that we have a way to verify the upper bound of the fraction of tagged bits (counts caused
by multiphoton pulses from the source) or equivalently, the lower bound of untagged bits
(counts caused by single-photon pulses from the source). However, the ILM-GLLP[7, 8]
result does not tell us how to make the verification itself. What it has presented is how to
make the finall key given the verified results of fraction of tagged bits or fraction of untagged
bits. Therefore, the only difficulty remained for secure QKD in practice is the verification.
Non-trivial verification is the central issue of the decoy-state method.
Before going into the decoy-state method, let’s first recall some concepts and results of
ILM-GLLP[7, 8].
A. Tagged bits
Suppose in a QKD protocol, Alice is the sender and Bob is the receiver. In the standard
protocols such as BB84 with perfect single photon source, there is no tagged bits because
an Eavesdropper (Eve) in principle will cause errors to Bob’s bits if she wants to know some
of the bit values of Bob. However, if Alice uses an imperfect source, things will be different.
Suppose sometimes Alice sends a multi-photon pulse. All the photons in the pulse have
the same state. Eve can keep one photon from the pulse and sends other photons of the
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pulse to Bob. This action will not cause errors to the bit value to bob but Eve may have
full information about Bob’s bit: After the measurement basis is announced by Alice or
Bob, Eve will be always able to measure the photon she has kept in the correct basis. If
Eve can know some of bit values without causing any errors, these bits are defined as tagged
bits. Given an imperfect source, whenever Alice sends out a multi-photon pulse and Bob’s
detector counts, we assume that a tagged bit has been produced. We don’t care how many
photons the pulse may contain after it is transmitted to Bob’s side.
Remark. Bob cannot verify the tagged bits at his side by measuring the photon number in
each comming pulses. Say, suppose he finds certain pulse contains only one photon. The
bit caused by that pulse could be still a tagged bit because the pulse could have contained
two photons at Alice’s side.
B. Final key distillation with a fraction of tagged bits.
In the standard BB84 protocol with perfect single photon source, there is no tagged bits.
To distill the final key, we need the information of bit-flip error rate tb and phase-flip rate
tp. Based on this information we can in principle have a CSS[3] code to correct all bit-
flip errors (error correction) and to compress any third party’s information to almost zero
(privacy amplication). In pararticular, we shall use a CSS code that consumes nrH(tb) =
nr[−tblog2tb − (1 − tb)log2(1 − tb)] raw bits to correct bit-flip errors and nrH(tp) raw bits
for the privacy amplification. Here nr is the number of raw bits. It was shown by ILM-
GLLP[7, 8] that we can also distill the secure final key by a CSS code even with an imperfect
source, if we know the bit-flip rate, phase-flip rate and upper bound value of the fraction
of tagged bits, ∆. In particular we shall use a CSS code that consumes ntH(tb) raw bits
for error correction and nr[∆ + (1 −∆)H(
tp
1−δ
) for privacy amplification. This is to say, in
a protocol with perfect single-photon source, we shall know how to distill the final key if
we know the bit-flip rate and phase-flip rate; in a protocol with an imperfect source, we
shall also know how to distill the final key if we know the bit-flip rate, phase-flip rate and
∆ value, the upper bound of the tagged bits. Equivalently, we can also use ∆1, the lower
bound of untagged bits. It is easy to verify the bit-flip rate and phase-flip rate: Alice and
Bob simply take some samples and announce the bit values. Asymptotically, the error rate
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rate of the remained raw bits is equal to the error rate of those samples. However, to know a
tight bound value of ∆ or ∆1 is not so straightforward. The central task for the decoy-state
method is to make a tight verification of ∆ or ∆1.
II. HWANG’S IDEA AND PROTOCOL
The first idea of decoy-state method and the first protocol is given by Hwang[9]. Hwang
proposed to do the non-trivial verification by changing the intensity of pulses. In Hwang’s
first protocol, two intensities are used. The intensity of signal pulses is set to be around
0.3 and the intensity of decoy-state pulses is set to be 1. By watching the counting rate of
decoy pulses, one can deduce the upper bound of the fraction of tagged bits among all those
signal pulses.
For clarity, we first demonstrate why a tight verification is non-trivial. Knowing the
photon-number distribution of the source and the channel transmittance to one coherent
state is insufficient for a tight verification. Consider a coherent state with intensity µ.
With the phase totally randomized, the state is a probabilistic mixture of different photon
numbers:
ρµ = e
−µ
∞∑
n=0
µn
n!
|n〉〈n| (1)
and |n〉〈n| is the Fock state of n photons. Since Alice does not know the photon number
in each individual pulse, their knowledge about the channel transmittance is the averaged
transmittance to the whole mixed state. However, in principle, the channel (Eve’s channel)
transmittance can be selective: it can be more transparent given a multi-photon pulse.
Suppose the channel transmittance is η. (Since Eve may also control Bob’s detector, here η
is the overall transmittance for channel and detector.) It is possible that the transmittance
for single-photon pulses is actually zero. If we use the worst-case estimation, we require
µ < η in order to obtain a meaningful result for the verification. In practice, if the distance
is longer than 100kms, it is possible that η value is in the magnitude order of 10−3 or 10−4,
then the worst-case verification doesn’t work.
Earlier, the PNS attack has been investigated where Alice and Bob monitor only how
many non-vacuum signals arise, and how many errors happen. However, it was then shown[6]
that the simple-minded method does not guarantee the final security. It is shown[6] that
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in a typical parameter regime nothing changes if one starts to monitor the photon number
statistics as Eve can adapt her strategy to reshape the photon number distribution such
that it becomes Poissonian again.
Remark: Here PNS attack allows any method for Eve to split the multi-photon pulses, pro-
vided that it does not violate laws of the nature. Although some types of specific PNS attack,
e.g., the beam-splitter attack could be detected by simple method such as tomography at
Bob’s side, a method to manage whatever type of PNS attack is strongly non-trivial.
However, as it was first shown by Hwang[9], by changing the intensity of pulses, one can
make the verification unconditionally and more efficiently. We now start from the classical
statistical principle.
Principle 1. Given a large number of independent pulses, the averaged value of any physical
quantity per pulse in a randomly chosen subset of pulses must be (almost) equal to that
of the remained pulses, if the number of pulses in the subset and the number of remained
pulses is large.
In a standard QKD protocols with perfect single-photon source, this principle is used for the
error test: They check the error rate of a random subset, and use this as the error rate of the
remained bits. Also, this principle can be used for estimation of other quantities, such as the
counting rate. In the protocol, Alice sends pulses to Bob. Given a loss channel, whenever a
pulse is sent out from Alice, Bob’s detector may click may not click. If his detector clicks, a
raw bit is generated. Counting rate is the ratio of the number of Bob’s click and the number
of pulses sent out from Alice. More specifically, if source x sends out N pulses and Bob’s
detector clicks nx times meanwhile, the counting rate for pulses from source x is Sx =
nx
N
.
In the QKD protocol, Alice controls the source. Consider a case of a mixed source of X and
source Y. When we say a mixed source of X and Y, we mean that each maybe from X or Y
randomly. If these two sources produce the same state and each pulses are independent and
the number pulses from each source is sufficiently large, then the counting rate of source X
must be equal to that of source Y, since X and Y can be regarded as one source and pulses
from X can be regarded as samples for testing and pulses from source Y can be regarded as
the remained pulses.
Principle 2. Asymptotically, given a mixed source of X and Y, Alice can verify the counting
rate of source Y by watching counting rate of source X, if X and Y produce the same states
and each pulses are independent.
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Now we see how Hwang’s original protocol[9] works. For mathematical simplicity, we
give up Hwang’s original derivation which involves counting rates of each Fock states and
complicated inequalities. We use the technique of density matrix convex and there are only
a few parameters involved[10]. We omit the dark count at the moment and assume that a
vacuum pulse from Alice never causes counts at Bob’s side. Consider the source state in
equation(1). The state can be re-written in the following equivalent convex form:
ρµ = e
−µ|0〉〈0|+ µe−µ|1〉〈1|+ cρc (2)
and c = 1− e−µ − µe−µ > 0,
ρc =
1
c
∞∑
n=2
Pn(µ)|n〉〈n| (3)
and Pn(µ) =
e−µµ−n
n!
. This convex form shows that the source sends out 3 types of pulses:
sometimes sends out vacuum, sometimes sends out |1〉〈1|, sometimes sends pulses of state ρc.
Bob’s counts caused by ρc from Alice are regarded as tagged bits. Since we know explicitly
the probability of pulses ρc for our source, we shall know the fraction of tagged bits if we
know sc, the counting rate of state ρc. The counting rate of any state ρ is the probability
that Bob’s detector counts whenever Alice sends ρ. If we have another source A′ which
always produces state ρc, then we can combine source A, the coherent source ρµ and A
′.
Say, Alice uses a mixed source of A and A’. After Alice sends out all pulses, Bob announces
which time is counted and which time is not. Then Alice knows the counting rate of source
A’. The counting rate of source A’ is just the counting rate of all pulses ρc from source A,
asymptotically. Since Eve cannot treat the pulses from source A’ and the pulses of state
ρc from source A differently. This can be understood more easily in the following way: the
above mixed source of A and A’ can be equivalently regarded as 4 sources since source A
can be equivalently regarded as 3 sub-sources: sub-source A0 containing all vacuum pulses
from A, sub-source A1 contains all single-photon pulses from A and sub-source Ac contains
all pulses of state ρc. Since the states of pulses from source A’ and source Ac are identical,
Eve can not treat them differently. Therefore the counting rate for pulses from source A’
must be equal to the that of source Ac. Since source Ac contains all multi-photon pulses
for source A, therefore the value sc for source A is verified by watching the counting rate of
source A’. This is a natural consequence of Principle 2: Source A’ and sub-source Ac makes
a mixed source, they each produce the same identical pulses, therefore Alice can verify the
counting rate of sub-source Ac by watching that of source A’.
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In the above toy model, we have used source A’ that produces state ρc deterministically.
In practice we don’t have such a source. But we have another coherent source with a different
intensity µ′ > µ. We now consider a realistic mixed source: source A is the coherent source
with intensity µ, source Aµ′ is another coherent source with intensity µ
′. Since µ′ > µ, the
state for source Aµ′ can be written in the convex form:
ρµ′ = e
−µ′ |0〉〈0|+ µ′e−µ
′
|1〉〈1|+ c
µ′2e−µ
′
µ2e−µ
ρc + dρd. (4)
The source Aµ′ can be equivalently regarded as a mixed source which contains the 4 sub-
sources: Aµ′0 which contains all vacuum pulses from Aµ′ , Aµ′1 which contains all single-
photon pulses from Aµ′ , Aµ′c that contains all ρc pulses of source Aµ′ and Aµ′d that contains
all ρd pulses of source Aµ′ . Therefore the mixed source of A,Aµ′ now contains 7 sub-sources.
Since state from sub-source Aµ′c is identical to that of sub-source Ac, the counting rate of
source Aµ′c should be equal to that of Ac, i.e., the counting rate of state ρc from source A.
If Alice knew which pulses were from sub-source Aµ′c, she would know the value sc exactly
therefore know the value of fraction of tagged bits explicitly for source A, and then did key
distillation based on raw bits from source A. However, Alice had no way to know which
pulses are from sub-source Aµ′c. But she know which pulses are from source Aµ′ . We shall
show that she can know an upper bound of the fraction of tagged bits from source A by
watching the counting rate of source Aµ′ .
In the protocol, Alice can watch the (averaged) counting rate for source Aµ′ and we
soppose the value is Sµ′ . According to equation (4), we have the following equation:
Sµ′ = µ
′e−µ
′
s1 + c
µ′2e−µ
′
µ2e−µ
sc + dsd. (5)
Here we have assumed no vacuum dark count and denoted sd for the counting rate for state
ρd, i.e. for source Aµ′d , s1 for counting rate of single-photon pulses, i.e., for source Aµ′ . Alice
does not know the value of s1 or sd but she knows the fact s1 ≥ 0 and sd ≥ 0. Therefore we
transform eq(5) into an inequality for the upper bound of sc:
sc ≤
cµ2e−µ
µ′2e−µ′
Sµ′ (6)
This bound is obtained based on the observation of source A. This is the bound value for
counting rate of sub-source Aµ′c. This is also the bound value for state ρc from any source,
including those ρc pulses from source A, since Eve cannot treat pulses of the same state
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differently according to which source the pulse is from. Therefore we have the following
upper bound for fraction of tagged bits of source A:
∆ ≤
µ2e−µSµ′
µ′2e−µ′Sµ
, (7)
and we have used
∆ = c
sc
Sµ
(8)
In the normal case that there is no Eve’s attack, Alice and Bob will find Sµ′/Sµ =
1−e−ηµ
′
1−e−ηµ
=
µ′/µ in their protocol therefore they can verify ∆ ≤ µe
−µ
µ′e−µ′
, which is just eq.(13) of Hwang’s
work[9].
The above is the main result of Hwang’s work. We have simplified the original derivation
given by Hwang[9]. In summary, Hwang’s protocol works in this way: Use the intensity
µ′ = 1 for the decoy state. By watching the counting rate of decoy state, we can obtain ∆
value for the signal state (intensity µ).
Although Hwang’s result of verification has been much better than the trivial worst-
case method, Hwang’s protocol should be further improved for immediate use in practice.
Hwang’s verified result is still much larger than the true value. We want a tighter estimation.
Remark: The security of Hwang’s method is a direct consequence the separate prior art
result of ILM-GLLP[7, 8]. ILM-GLLP[7, 8] have offered methods to distill the uncondition-
ally secure final key from raw key if the upper bound of fraction of tagged bits is known,
given whatever imperfect source and channel. Decoy-state method verifies such an upper
bound for coherent-state source. We can consider an analog using the model of pure water
distillation: Our task is to distill pure water by heating from raw water that may contain
certain poison constitute. Surppose it is known that the poison constitute will be evaporated
in the heating. We want to know how long the heating is needed to obtain the pure water
for certain. If we blindly heat the raw water for too long, all raw water will be evaporated
and we obtain nothing. If we heat the raw water for a too short period, the water could
be still poisonous. “ILM-GLLP” finds an explicit formula for the heating time which is a
function of the upper bound of the fraction of poison constitute. They have proven that we
(almost) always obtain pure water if we use that formula for the heating time. However, the
formula itself does not tell how to examine the fraction of poison constitute. “Decoy-state”
method is a method to verify a tight upper bound of the fraction of the poison constitute. It
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is guaranteed by the classical statistical principle that the verified upper bound by “decoy-
state method” is (always) larger than the true value. Using this analog, the next question
is how to obtain a tighter upper bound: if the verified value over estimates too much, it is
secure but it is inefficient. We want a way to obtain a value that is only a bit larger than
the true value in the normal case that there is no Eve (for efficiency), and it is (almost)
always larger than the true in whatever case (for security). This can be achieved by the
improved decoy-state method. Here the term “(almost) always” means “with a probability
exponentially close to 1”.
III. IMPROVED DECOY-STATE METHOD
The improvement is possible because Hwang’s method has not sufficiently using the
different intensities. Actually, in doing the verification, Alice has only used the counting
rate of one intensity, the source Aµ′ . It should be interesting to consider the case that Alice
uses more intensities.
After Hwang’s work, decoy-state method is further studied. Ref[11] reviewed the PNS
attack and the elementary idea of decoy-state method with some shortly-stated suggestions
for possible improvement, but there is no conclusive result. It suggests doing the verification
by using two intensities, vacuum and very weak coherent state. However this idea seems to
be inefficient in practice due to the possible fluctuation of dark count[12]. Latter, a protocol
with infinite number of intensities is proposed[13] and the result in the infinity limit is given.
The main result there[13] has been published in Ref[14].
Here we are most interested in a protocol that is practically efficient. Obviously, there
should be several criterion. 1. The protocol must be clearly stated. For example, there
should be quantitative description about the intensities used and quantitative result about
the verification. Because we need the explicit information of intensities in the implementa-
tion and the explicit value of ∆ for key distillation. 2. The result of verified value ∆ should
be tight in the normal case when there is no Eve. This criterion is to guarantee a good final
key rate. 3. It should only use a few different intensities. 4. It should be robust to possible
statistical fluctuations. Say, in the non-asymptotic case, it only needs a reasonable number
of pulses to make the verification. Note that the counting rates are very small parame-
ters. The effects of possible statistical fluctuations can be very important. Concerning the
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above criterion, a 3-intensity protocol is then proposed[10]. The protocol uses 3 intensities:
vacuum, µ and µ′ for the verification. For convenience, we shall always assume
µ′ > µ;µ′e−µ
′
> µe−µ (9)
in this paper. Since we randomly change the intensities among 3 values, we can regard it as
the mixing of 3 sources. Source A0 contains those vacuum pulses, A contains those pulses
of intensity µ and source Aµ′ contains those pulses of intensity µ
′. States from source A and
Aµ′ are given by eq.(2) and eq.(4), respectively. In the protocol, they can direct watch the
counts of each source of A0, A, Aµ′. Suppose they find S0, Sµ, Sµ′ for each of them. In the
asymptotic case, we have the following equations:
Sµ = e
−µS0 + µe
−µs+ csc (10)
Sµ′ = e
−µ′s0 + µ
′e−µ
′
s1 + c
µ′2e−µ
′
µ2e−µ
sc + dsd (11)
In the above we have used the same notations S0, s1, sc in both equations. This is because
we have assumed that the counting rates of the same state from different sources are equal.
S0 is known, s1 and sd are unknown, but they are never less than 0. Therefore setting sd, s1
to be zero we can obtain the following crude result by using eq.(11) alone.
csc ≤
µ2e−µ
µ′2e−µ′
(
Sµ′ − e
−µ′s0 − µ
′e−µ
′
s1
)
. (12)
However, we can tighten the verification by using eq.(10). Having obtained the crude results
above, we now show that the verification can be done more sophisticatedly and one can
further tighten the bound significantly. In the inequality (6), we have dropped terms s1
and sd, since we only have trivial knowledge about s1 and sd there, i.e., s1 ≥ 0 and sd ≥ 0.
Therefore, inequality(12) has no advantage at that moment. However, after we have obtained
the crude upper bound of sc, we can have a larger-than-0 lower bound for s1, provided that
our crude upper bound for ∆ given by eq.(6) is not too large. From eq.(2) we have
e−µs0 + µe
−µs1 + csc = Sµ. (13)
With the crude upper bound for sc given by eq.(6), we have the non-trivial lower bound for
s1 now:
s1 ≥ Sµ − e
−µs0 − csc > 0. (14)
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Therefore tight values for sc and s1 can be obtained by solving the simultaneous constraints
of equation (13) and inequality (12). We have the following final bound after solving them:
∆ ≤
µ
µ′ − µ
(
µe−µSµ′
µ′e−µ′Sµ
− 1
)
+
µe−µs0
µ′Sµ
. (15)
Here we have used eq.(8). In the case of s0 << η, if there is no Eve., S
′
µ/Sµ = µ
′/µ. Alice
and Bob must be able to verify
∆ =
µ
(
eµ
′
−µ − 1
)
µ′ − µ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
µ′−µ→0
= µ (16)
in the protocol. This is close to the real value of fraction of multi-photon counts: 1 − e−µ,
given that η << 1. In this 3-intensity protocol for the verification, both µ and µ′ can be set
in a reasonable range therefore both of them can be used for final key distillation. Of course,
if we also want to use source Aµ′ for key distillation, we need the value ∆
′, the upper bound
of the fraction of tagged bits for source Aµ′ . Given sc, we can calculate the lower bound of
s1 through eq.(14). Given s1, we can also calculate the upper bound of ∆
′, the fraction of
multi-photon count among all counts caused by pulses from source Aµ′ . Explicitly,
∆′ ≤ 1− (1−∆−
e−µs0
Sµ
)eµ−µ
′
−
e−µ
′
s0
Sµ′
. (17)
The values of µ, µ′ should be chosen in a reasonable range, e.g., from 0.2 to 0.5.
IV. STATISTICAL FLUCTUATIONS
The results above are only for the asymptotic case. In practice, there are statistical
fluctuations, i.e., Eve. has non-negligibly small probability to treat the pulses from different
sources a little bit differently, even though the pulses have the same state. Mathematically,
this can be stated by
sρ(µ
′) = (1 + rρ)sρ(µ) (18)
and the real number rρ is the relative statistical fluctuation for counting rate of stte ρ in
different sources of pulses. It is insecure if we simply use the asymptotic result in practice.
Since the actual values are actually different from what we have estimated from the observed
data. Our task remained is to verify a tight upper bound of ∆ and the probability that the
real value of ∆ breaks the verified upper bound is exponentially close to 0.
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The counting rate of any state ρ from different sources now can be slightly different
from the counting rate of the same state ρ from another sources, Aµ, with non-negligible
probability. We shall use the primed notation for the counting rate for any state from source
Aµ′ and the original notation for the counting rate for any state from source A. Explicitly,
constraints (6,14) are now converted to


e−µs0 + µe
−µs1 + csc = Sµ,
cs′c ≤
µ2e−µ
µ′2e−µ′
(
Sµ′ − µ
′e−µ
′
s′1 − e
−µ′s′0
)
.
(19)
Setting s′x = (1− rx)sx for x = 1, c and s
′
0 = (1 + r0)s0 with rx > 0 we obtain
µ′eµ
[
(1− rc)
µ′
µ
− 1
]
∆ ≤ µeµ
′
Sµ′/Sµ − µ
′eµ + [(µ′ − µ)s0 + r1s1 + r0s0]/Sµ. (20)
From this we can see, if µ and µ′ are too close, ∆ can be very large. The important question
here is now whether there are reasonable values for µ′, µ so that our method has significant
advantage to the previous method[9]. The answer is yes.
GivenN1+N2 copies of state ρ, suppose the counting rate forN1 randomly chosen states is
sρ and the counting rate for the remained states is s
′
ρ, the probability that sρ−s
′
ρ > δρ is less
than exp
(
−1
4
δρ
2N0/sρ
)
and N0 = Min(N1, N2). Now we consider the difference of counting
rates for the same state from different sores, A and Aµ′ . To make a faithful estimation for
exponentially sure, we require δρ
2N0/sρ = 100. This causes a relative fluctuation
rρ =
δρ
sρ
≤ 10
√
1
sρN0
. (21)
The probability of violation is less than e−25. To formulate the relative fluctuation r1, rc by
sc and s1, we only need to check the number of pulses in ρc, |1〉〈1| in each sources in the
protocol. That is, using eq.(21), we can replace r1, rc in eq.(19) |1〉〈1| in each sources in the
protocol. That is, using eq.(21), we can replace r1, rc in eq.(19) by 10e
µ/2
√
1
µs1N
, 10
√
1
cscN
,
respectively and N is the number of pulses in source A. Since we assume the case where
vacuum-counting rate is much less than the counting rate of state ρµ, we omit the effect of
fluctuation in vacuum counting, i.e., we set r0 = 0. With these inputs, eq.(19) can now be
solved numerically. The results are listed in the following table. From this table we can see
that good values of µ, µ′ indeed exist and our verified upper bounds are sufficiently tight to
make QKD over very lossy channel. Note that so far this is the only non-asymptotic result
among all existing works on decoy-state. From the table we can see that our non-asymptotic
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TABLE I: The verified upper bound of the fraction of tagged pulses in QKD. ∆H is the result
from Hwang’s method. ∆R is the true value of the fraction of multi-photon counts in case there
is no Eve. ∆H and ∆R do not change with channel transmittance. ∆W1 is bound for pulses from
source A, given that η = 10−3. ∆W2 and ∆
′
W2 are bound values for the pulses from source A,Aµ′
respectively, given that η = 10−4. We assume s0 = 10
−6. The number of pulses is 1010 from source
A,A′µ in calculating ∆W1 and 8 × 10
10 in calculating ∆W2,∆
′
W2. (Our results will only increase
by 0.03 even if we only use 1010 pulses. Actually, as we shall show it in Table 2 and 3, pretty good
results can be obtained with only 1010 pulses[17].) 4×109 vacuum pulses is sufficient for source A0.
The bound values will change by less than 0.01 if the value of s0 is 1.5 times larger. The numbers
inside brackets are chosen values for µ′. For example, in the column of µ = 0.25, data 30.9%(0.41)
means, if we choose µ = 0.25, µ′ = 0.41, we can verify ∆ ≤ 30.9% for source A.
µ 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
∆H 44.5% 52.9% 60.4% 67.0%
∆R 18.3% 22.2% 25.9% 29.5%
∆W1 23.4%(0.34) 28.9%(0.38) 34.4%(0.43) 39.9%(0.45)
∆W2 25.6%(0.39) 30.9%(0.41) 36.2%(0.45 ) 41.5%(0.47)
µ′ 0.39 0.41 0.45 0.47
∆H 71.8% 74.0% 78.0% 79.8%
∆R 32.3% 33.7% 36.2% 37.5%
∆′W2 40.1% 42.2% 45.8% 48.6
values are less than Hwang′s asymptotic values already. Our verified values are rather close
to the true values. We have assumed the vacuum count rate s0 = 10
−6 in the calculation.
If s0 is smaller, our results will be even better. Actually, the value of s0 (dark count) can
be even lower than the assumed value here[15, 16]. In the real set-up given by Gobby et
al[15], the light losses a half over every 15km, the devices and detection loss is 4.5% and
s0 ≤ 8.5×10
−7. Given these parameters, we believe that our protocol works over a distance
longer than 120km with with µ = 0.3, µ′ = 0.45 and a reasonable number of total pulses. In
the table, we have chosen both values of µ, µ′ in a reasonable range. Of course, our method
and Eq.(15) also work for other values of µ, µ′ which are beyond the table. This shows that
eq.(15) indeed gives a rather tight upper bound.
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V. ROBUSTNESS TO OTHER SMALL ERRORS
We now study how robust our method is. In the protocol, we use different intensities.
In practice, there are both statistical fluctuations and small operational errors in switching
the intensity. We shall show that, by using the counting rates of 3 intensities, one can still
verify tight bounds even we take all theses errors and fluctuations into consideration.
There are small operational errors inevitably. Say, in setting the intensity of any light
pulse, the actual intensity can be slightly different from the one we have assumed. More
specifically, suppose the number of pulses from source A0, A, Aµ′ areN0, Nµ, Nµ′ , respectively.
Due to the small operational error, the intensity of light pulses in source A0 could be
slightly larger than 0. This doesn’t matter because a little bit over estimation on the
vacuum count will only decrease the efficiency a little bit but not at all undermine the
security. Therefore we don’t care about the operational error of this part. Say, given n0
counts for all the pulses from source A0, we then simply assume the tested vacuum counting
rate is s0 = n0/N0, though we know that the actual value of vacuum counting rate is less
than this.
We shall only consider sources A,Aµ′ . First, there are statistical fluctuations to the
states itself since the number of pulses are finite. Say, e.g., given Nµ pulses of intensity µ,
the number of vacuum, single-photon state and multi-photon state ρc could be a bit different
from the assumed values of P0(µ), P1(µ), Pc(µ), respectively. The similarly deviations also
apply to the pulses of intensity µ′. But the deviation should be small given that the number
of pulses in each sources is not too small. Say, e.g., given Nµ ≥ 10
9, µ = 0.2, the relative
fluctuation for the probability of state ρc is less than 10
√
1
Nµ(1−e−µ−µe−µ)
< 0.2%. Besides
this, there are operational errors. At any time Alice decides to set the intensity of the pulse
to be µ or µ′, the actual intensity could be µi or µ
′
i, which can be a bit different from µ
or µ′. Therefore we should replace Pµ(n) and Pµ′(n) by slightly different distributions of
P˜µ(n) =
1
Nµ
∑Nµ
i=0 Pµi(n) = Pµ(n)(1 + ǫn) and P˜µ′(n)
1
Nµ′
∑Nmu′
i=0 Pµ′i(n) = Pµ′(n)(1 + ǫ
′
n). Base
on these, we have the following new convex formula for the actual states of each source given
both statistical errors of states and operational errors:
ρ˜µ = P˜0|0〉〈0|+ P˜1|1〉〈1|+ c˜ρ˜c (22)
and P˜0,1 = P˜µ(0, 1); c˜ = 1 − P˜0 − P˜1. Since the new distributions are only a bit different
from the old ones, there must exist a positive number d˜ and a density operator ρ˜d so that
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the state from source Aµ′ is convexed by
ρ˜µ′ = P˜
′
0|0〉〈0|+ P˜
′
1|1〉〈1|+ c˜
′ρ˜c + d˜ρ˜d. (23)
This, together with the possible statistical fluctuation to counting rates gives the following
simultaneous constraint:

Pµ(0)(1 + ǫ0)s0 + Pµ(1)(1 + ǫ1)s1 + c(1 + ǫc)sc = Sµ,
Pµ′(0)(1 + ǫ
′
0)s
′
0 + Pµ′(1)(1 + ǫ
′
1)s
′
1 +
µ′2e−µ
′
µ2e−µ
c(1 + ǫ′c)s
′
c ≤ Sµ′
(24)
and c = 1 − Pµ(0) − Pµ(1); c
′ = µ
′2e−µ
′
µ2e−µ
c. Suppose we know the upper bounds of all values
of |ǫx|, |ǫ
′
x|, x = 0, 1, c, we can calculate the lower bound of s1 and upper bound of sc. Say,
we try all possible values of ǫx, ǫ
′
x and take the worst case as the verified result. After
calculation, we find the result does not change too much given small |ǫx|, |ǫ
′
x|. For example,
given that |ǫx| < 2%, |ǫ
′
x| < 2% and Nµ = Nµ′ = 10
10, N0 = 4 × 10
9 and S0 = 10
−6, the
lower bound of single-photon counting rate can be verified to be larger than 0.95s˜1 and s˜1
is the lower bound of single-photon counts given ǫx = ǫ
′ = 0.
VI. FURTHER STUDIES
After the major works presented in[9, 10, 14], the decoy-state method has been further
studied. Harrington studied the effect of fluctuation of the state itself. Ref.[17] proposed a
4-state protocol: using 3 of them to make optimized verification and using the other one µs
as the main signal pulses. This is because, if we want to optimize the verification of ∆ value,
µ, µ′ cannot be chosen freely. Therefore we use another intensity µs to optimize the final key
rate. It is shown numerically on how to choose the intensity for the main signal pulses (µs)
and good key rates are obtained in a number of specific conditions. Ref.[18] further studied
the 3-intensity protocol. In particular, statistical fluctuations to the bit error rates are also
considered there and a type of stronger key rate formula is suggested there. An experiment
was also done[20].
VII. SUMMARY
In summary, we have reviewed the historic development of the decoy state method, in-
cluding the background, development and some delicate concepts. Given an imperfect source
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and a very lossy channel, the PNS attack can make the QKD in practice totally insecure.
Given the result of ILM-GLLP[7, 8], one knows how to distill the secure final key if he knows
the fraction of tagged bits. The purpose of decoy state method is to do a tight verification
of the the fraction of tagged bits. The main idea of decoy-state method is changing the
intensities of source light and one can verify the fraction of tagged bits of certain intensity
by watching the the counting rates of pulses of different intensities. Since the counting rates
are small quantities, the effect of statistical fluctuation is very important. It has been shown
that 3-state decoy-state method in practice can work even with the fluctuations and other
errors.
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